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Introduction 
There is a considerable body of literature documenting the significant first-day 
returns of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). These returns have been economically and 
statistically large, particularly during the "bubble" period of 1999-2000, during 
which the average first-day return was approximately 65%. Further, Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) find that finns, on average, leave approximately $9.1 million on the 
table, which is roughly twice the amount of direct fees paid. The question this raises 
is: Why do issuers accept such a large amount of money left on the table (MLOT)? 
Many potential explanations exist for this large opportunity cost; however, one 
that fonns the basis for mUltiple theoretical models is asymmetric infonnation 
between buyers and sellers (e.g., Rock 1986; Benveniste and Spindt 1989). We 
examine this particular explanation in the context of Real Estate Investment Trust 
(REIT) IPOs, hypothesizing this type ofIPO is inherently more transparent (i.e., less 
infonnation asymmetry) and should therefore experience a lower cost of issuance. 
In general, there are several reasons REIT IPOs should be less difficult to value 
than traditional issues. For example, equity REUs report the portfolio of buildings 
and other tangible assets they hold, which can then be used to estimate occupancy, 
rent payments, and cash flow. In contrast, traditional issues may not have as 
extensive a set of information on underlying asset holdings. Therefore, the future 
cash flows of REUs may be less uncertain than those associated with a traditional 
issue, where the assets are largely unknown (particularly to investors) or, at the least, 
difficult to value since they are typically less tangible. 
Several studies have examined the level of information asymmetry and the 
corresponding level of underpricing for REIT IPOs. For example, Wang et al. (1992) 
document a 2.82% price decline on the first day of trading for a sample of REIT 
IPOs issued during the period of 1971-1988. However, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) 
examine the 1991-1994 period and find average first-day returns of 3.60%. They 
attribute this turnaround (at least partially) to an increased difficulty associated with 
valuing more recent REU IPOs, although the level of underpricing is still lower 
compared to traditional IPO finns. 
Most of these prior studies measure the costs associated with information 
asymmetry using first-day return (i.e., initial underpricing). However, an alternative 
branch of research (e.g., Barry 1984; Dolvin and Jordan 2007) suggests another 
method for measuring issue costs that accounts for the share retention (i.e., 
overhang) decisions of preexisting owners. Specifically, initial underpricing is 
defined as money left on the table relative to offering proceeds, which implicitly 
assumes all preexisting shares are sold in the offering; however, this is rarely the 
case. Therefore, a more reasonable measure, particularly from the perspective of 
preexisting owners, may be money left on the table relative to preexisting equity 
value, which effectively controls for the level of share retention by preexisting 
owners. Following Dolvin and Jordan (2007), we refer to this measure as the 
opportunity cost of issuance (OCI). 
REUs, as a whole, are less likely to have preexisting shares, simply based on the 
structure of the industry; therefore, a comparison of underpricing to more traditional 
issues may be less meaningful than previously thought. Thus, results of existing 
studies mayor may not reflect the true cost of going public in these relatively unique 
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investment assets. Similarly, the use of "umbrella partnerships," which began in 
1992, may also impact the issue cost comparison. In this fonn of REIT, one or more 
individuals contribute real estate holdings to the partnership in exchange for 
operating units. Although these units are not technically shares of stock (and thus 
would not show up in preexisting equity), the operating units are convertible to 
shares of stock, effectively making them "share-like" securities. Thus, in calculating 
the opportunity cost of issuance, it is also necessary to control for this structure. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on REIT IPOs in a number of 
ways. First, many prior studies examine REIT IPOs in isolation. We examine both 
traditional IPOs and REIT IPOs in an effort to focus on the specific differences in the 
two types of issues and the variables that influence those differences. Second, rather 
than examining only underpricing, we also focus on the OCI, which controls for the 
level of share retention by preexisting owners. Third, we examine whether the type of 
REIT IPO (i.e., equity vs. mortgage) is influential in predicting issue cost. For each 
segment of the analysis, we further control for the use of umbrella partnerships 
(upREITs), which may impact the level of share retention and therefore the OCI. 
We find, consistent with previous studies, that REIT IPOs have lower initial-day 
returns relative to traditional IPOs, most likely due to the reduced complexity of 
valuing the assets that comprise the REIT IPOs. We find further evidence of this in 
smaller offer price revisions, which is also consistent with reduced infonnation 
asymmetry. However, when controlling for the level of share retention, which is 
lower for REITs, the reduction in risk associated with less uncertainty in valuation 
does not result in lower issuance costs for existing owners. This result is robust to 
controlling for the UPREIT structure. Thus, although REIT underpricing is lower, 
the difference in preissuance share structure results in an OCI that is statistically the 
same. Continuing to control for the UPREIT structure, we also find that the type of 
REIT (i.e., mortgage or equity) is immaterial to the level of OCI, as both types 
exhibit approximately the same level relative to traditional IPOs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: "lnfonnation AsymJ11cuy and 
the Cost of Going Public" discusses informational asymmetries and the resulting 
issuance costs in IPOs. "RElT JPOs" briefly discusses the structure of REIT issuances. 
"Datil and Methods" presents data and methods. "Results" presents results, and Section 
"Conclusions" concludes. 
Information Asymmetry and the Cost of Going Public 
Theoretical models of infonnation asymmetry have provided a framework for 
explaining IPO "mispricing" (see Rock 1986). The existence of asymmetric 
infonnation forces issuers to offer shares at a discount (relative to the true market 
value of the issuing firm), which implies a positive relation between the degree of 
asymmetric information and issuance costs. Previous studies generally address this 
relation by examining underpricing, or the initial-day return, which is defined as 
money left on the table (MLOT) divided by the proceeds of the offering. 1 
Underpricing is often defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing market price 
on the first day of trading; however, these are equivalent definitions. 
3 Dolvin, REIT IPOs and the Cost of Going Public
It is important to note that underpricing fails to control for the number of shares 
retained by preexisting owners. In fact, as mentioned earlier, underpricing implicitly 
assumes that all preexisting shares are sold in the offering, which is generally not the 
case. As an extreme example, consider a firm that goes public by issuing a single 
share. Any level of underpricing is essentially irrelevant since its dilutive effect on 
the value of the firm would be so small, and the money left on the table would be 
minor in comparison to the overall stake of preexisting owners. 
Put differently, the wealth effect on preexisting owners (i.e., MLOT) is 
determined by the risk of the offering, including the amount of asymmetric 
infonnation, not by the share issuance decision. Thus, studies focusing on 
underpricing mayor may not reach accurate conclusions regarding the underlying 
relations between characteristics of the offer and the cost of going public, 
particularly in situations where industry ownership structure is systematically 
different, such as the case with REUs. Specifically, firms that have high 
underpricing may actually have a relatively low issuance cost if owners retain a 
large portion of shares. Alternatively, preexisting owners of finns with lower 
underpricing may not benefit from this relation ifvery few shares are retained, which 
is generally the case for REUs and, in particular, for non-UPREU firms. We 
examine whether this latter scenario is significant to the cost of issuance for REU 
lPOs. 
Following Barry (l984), Dolvin and Jordan (2007) formally address the relation 
between underpricing and the true wealth effect of an IPO, finding that underpricing 
is the product of two underlying components: the wealth effect and the share 
retention (i.e., overhang) decision. Dolvin and Jordan define the wealth effect in 
percentage terms, which they refer to as the opportunity cost of issuance (OCI): 
OCI = _M_L_O_T = -::-N---:o-,:-(P_1_-.,....,----OP---=)'_=_ (1)
E P1NA - NopOP 
where E represents the preexisting equity value and is equal to the market value of 
the firm after the offering, less any new proceeds raised from newly created (i.e., 
plimary) shares. (Note, any secondary shares sold create proceeds for selling 
shareholders, not for the firm itself.) In addition, No is the number of shares offered 
in the IPO; P j is the market price at the end of the first trading day; OP is the offer 
price; NA is the total number of shares after the offering; and No,p is the number of 
primary (i.e., newly created) shares offered. Their derivation and results suggest that 
failing to control for the share retention decision introduces potential bias; therefore, 
in examining the relation between information asymmetry and the cost of going 
public, we study both initial-day underpricing and OCI. 
REIT IPOs 
REUs were originally designed as a conservative investment device through 
which individual investors could invest in real estate assets on a long-term basis. 
Thus, REUs have historically served the role of financial intermediaries that 
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enable individuals to invest in real estate assets, yet avoid the double taxation 
associated with traditional corporate structures by complying with strict operating 
requirements. 2 There are two basic types of RElTs. Equity RElTs are involved in the 
investment and operation of real physical assets, while mortgage RElTs purchase 
mortgage obligations. 3 
Prior to the Tax Refo lID Act of 1986, RElTs were precluded from actively 
managing their own portfolio. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) provide an in-depth 
discussion of the different environments before and after the Tax Refonn Act. Most 
notably, the post Act period is associated with a substantially higher level of 
managerial equity ownership. With increased preexisting ownership, share overhang 
becomes a more relevant variable and influences the applicability, or lack thereof, of 
initial-day underpricing as a measure of issuance costs. An additional result of this 
more active management style is more uncertainty about the market value of the 
finn. 
Wang et a!. (1992) suggest two additional reasons RElT IPOs may behave 
differently than traditional industry issues. First, REIT issues prior to 1990 had more 
uninfonned investors. However, the significantly lower levels of underpricing 
persisted throughout the 1990s even though the level of institutional ownership in 
REITs was as high as industrial issues (see Chan et al. 1998). Therefore, it appears 
this conjecture does not well explain the differing levels of underpricing. 
Another possible reason for the different levels of IPO underpricing suggested by 
Wang et al. (1992) is that REITs hold tangible assets (real properties and mortgages), 
whereas the asset base for industrial IPOs can be much more undefined. Chan et al. 
(200 I) examine this last explanation using Hong Kong IPOs and find evidence 
suggesting the difference in underlying assets cannot completely explain the 
difference in underpricing between the two types of issues. Therefore, they conclude 
there is a need to re-evaluate current explanations for the abnormal perfonnances of 
RElT IPOs relative to traditional issues. 
As identified earlier, an additional REIT structure may influence the level of 
issue costs faced by preexisting owners. Umbrella partnerships, which comprise 
over half of the largest RElTs, allow partners that contribute property to the RElT 
to receive operating units rather than shares. The structure, due to the 
convertibility of units to shares, allows partners to retain an effective ownership 
interest, while also reducing the initial tax burden associated with the fonnation of 
the partnership. If we were to calculate OCI (money left on the table relative to 
preexisting equity value) without controlling for these units, we would effectively 
underestimate preexisting equity and overestimate issuance costs. So, we 
necessarily adjust for this type of REIT. 
2 See Fass et al. (I <)%) and Jarchow (I <J8S) for an explanation of REIT operating procedures. 
3 Hybrid REITs, which could be considered a third type, invest in both physical and financial assets. 
These, however, make up a small fraction of the REIT population. 
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Data and Methods 
We examine a sample of issues that went public between 1986 and 2004. Prior to 
1986, many of the explanatory variables of interest are unreported or unreliable. 
Following traditional studies, we omit issues involving closed-end funds, unit issues, 
American depositary shares, mutual-to-stock conversions, reverse leveraged buy­
outs, and spin-offs. Unlike most studies, we also eliminate from our analyses firms 
with multiple share classes. 4 The reason these issues are eliminated is that the 
detennination of overhang, and therefore OCI, can be problematic for such firms, 
particularly when, for example, one Class A share can be converted into multiple 
Class B shares. 
We gather information on IPOs from the SNL Financial and SDC New Issues 
databases. In addition to company and issue information provided by SNL and SDC, 
we rely on the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database to provide closing market prices and information on shares 
outstanding on the date of issuance. We also use Loughran and Ritter's (2004) 
underwriter reputation variables and firm founding dates. Our final sample consists 
of 5,606 issues, 5,397 of which are traditional issues and 209 that are REIT issues. 
SNL also identifies REITs by type (mortgage, equity, or hybrid) and additionally 
identifies issues as UPREITs. Of the 209 REITS, 112 are UPREITs, which is 
approximately 54% of our sample. However, UPREITs did not exist prior to 1992, 
and after this time approximately 65% of our sample has the UPREIT structure. To 
determine the number of operating units that existed in each UPREIT at the issuance 
date, we consult prospectus and filing documents on the SEC's website. Table 1 
presents summary statistics for the entire sample. 
Panel A of Table I presents the variables designed to measure information 
asymmetry and issue costs. Initial is the initial-day return, defined as the percentage 
change from the offer price to the price at close of the first day of trading. This 
variable is equivalent to that used in the majority of IPO studies to capture the 
relative level of MLOT. OCI is the opportunity cost of issuance, as defined in Eq. 1. 
AdjOCI is also calculated using Eq. 1; however, preexisting equity is adjusted to 
reflect umbrella partnership operating units that are equivalent to common shares. 
Unfortunately, for 21 issues we are unable to obtain the number of partnership units; 
therefore, we eliminate these from our comparison for AdjOCl. ShareOver is share 
overhang, defined as the number of shares retained (by existing shareholders) 
relative to the total number of shares issued. AdjShareOver is share overhang 
adjusted for UPREIT operating units. Finally, Revision is a measure of offer price 
revisions, defined as the offer price less the initial low filing price, divided by the 
difference between the initial high and low filing prices. 
These variables measure the extent of information asymmetries in various ways. 
Initial and OCI (and AdjOCI) measure the extent of direct issuance costs, reflecting 
the difference between the offering price and the resulting market price. In other 
4 There are 410 non-RElTs with dual class shares. This structure is non-existent in RElTs, which may be 
attributable to the use of umbrella partnerships. 
6 Dolvin, REIT IPOs and the Cost of Going Public
words, they retlect the difference between the pre-issue valuation and the market­
driven response to the issuance. Revision is designed to measure the pre-issue 
uncertainty sun'ounding the issue. When there is considerable asymmetry sUlTound­
ing an issue, the pre-issue filing prices may be substantially adjusted to respond to 
new information that may reduce those informational deficiencies. 
Examining Panel A, we find each of the issue cost variables is significantly 
different for REIT IPOs relative to traditional issues, Consistent with prior studies 
(e.g. Wang et al. 199:? and Ling and Ryngaert 1997), we find a lower level of 
underpricing for RElT IPOs, possibly attributable to the lower degree of valuation 
uncertainty. We also find REITs to be associated with smaller pre-offer revisions. 
Interestingly, however, we find that REIT IPOs have higher OCI than traditional 
issues. Although not as large, this relation is robust to controlling for umbrella 
partnerships. 
Thus, we have conflicting univariate evidence in that Initial appears to indicate a 
lower cost of issuance for REIT LPOs, while OCI (and AdjOCI) indicates a higher 
cost of issuance. This may be explained by ShareOver, which indicates a much 
[ower level of share retention associated with REIT issues. Thus, our preliminary 
results suggest that although prior studies conclude REITs have a lower cost of 
issuance, our evidence suggests, in contrast, this relationship is of limited benefit to 
preexisting owners and may simply be a function of industry structure. 
The results to this point fail to account for underlying issue characteristics that 
may also be influencing the relations. Thus, to explore potential causes of the 
above differences, we report descriptive statistics on selected finn and offer 
characteristics in Panel B of Table 1. The variables in the panel are representative of 
those commonly examined in IPO research, but the list is not intended to be 
exhaustive. Specifically, we report means and t statistics from difference tests for the 
following: 
Proceeds Gross proceeds of the issue in millions of dollars 
Integer Dummy variable equal to one if the LPO offer price is an integer 
Rank Carter-Manaster (1990) rank of the lead underwriter, as updated by 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
Primary Dummy variable equal to one if the offering has 100 percent primary 
shares 
CrspYWI5 The CRSP value weighted index return for the 15 trading days prior to 
the issue 
PartialU The percentage change (fi'om the OIiginal midfile) in the final offer 
price if the change is positive (and zero otherwise) 
PartialD The percentage change (from the original midfile) in the final offer 
price if the change is negative (and zero otherwise) 
Nineties Dummy variable equal to one if the issue takes place in the 1990 to 
1998 period; and 
2000s Dummy variable equal to one if the issue takes place in the 2000 to 
2004 peliod 
Proceeds is a common conditioning variable in the LPO literature. For example, a 
larger offering may be indicative of less risk, as larger firms generally have more 
publicly available information. If so, then the risk of going public may be lower, 
resulting in a lower issuance cost. Previous studies, however, generally find an 
inconsistent relation between size and issuance cost across time periods. Nonethe­
less, controlling for size is particularly important for REITs given their large average 
size relative to traditional issues. 
Bradley et al. (2004) show that IPOs with integer offer prices tend to be more 
underpriced. They argue that integer prices are, in paJ1, a sign of valuation 
uncertainty, which leads to a greater reward to new shareholders. We again 
hypothesize that this payment, in the fOlm of MLOT, will come at the expense of 
existing shareholders. 
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Third-party agents such as underwriters may serve in a certification role, thereby 
reducing the risk of the offering (e.g., Dolvin 2005). However, previous studies find 
these agents are often associated with higher MLOT. This may be attributable to 
"grandstanding" (Gompers 1996), which is designed to attract future business. Thus, 
the predicted relation of Rank to OCI is undetermined. 
From our previous discussion, it is apparent that an increased level of overhang 
should serve to reduce the wealth lost by preexisting shareholders. It is possible, 
however, that in certain circumstances issuers may be constrained in their decisions 
on the optimal level of share retention. One such case involves issues where owners 
are retaining 100% of their shares. At this level, any additional increase in 
underpricing may directly result in a higher OCr. Thus, we examine Primary, 
hypothesizing that pure primary offerings (i.e., full retention of secondary shares) 
will be associated with a higher Initial and OCr. 
We also examine the overall market's return (value weighted) for the IS trading 
days prior to the issue (CRSPYW I5). This variable proxies for "hot" issuance 
markets and is generally positively associated with underpricing, although not 
necessarily OCI, as owners typically retain more shares in such times. Dolvin and 
Jordan (2007) find that offer price adjustments, particularly upward, result in a 
higher OCI, a result that is consistent with similar findings related to Initial. Thus, 
we examine PartialU and Pm1iaID. 
Lastly, we code each issue by time period. Particularly during the internet 
"bubble," IPOs as a whole expetienced higher issuance costs. However, Hat1Zell et 
al. (2005) find that such "hot" time periods are not significantly related to post-IPO 
REIT operating performance. Thus, this particular variable may be less relevant for 
REITs. 
Examining Panel B of Table I, it appears that REIT IPOs tend be significantly 
larger and have higher quality underwriters relative to traditional issues. Also, REIT 
IPOs have lower levels of upward and downward price revision, which is consistent 
with results for Revision. Moreover, REIT issues are less likely to be priced on an 
integer. We also find that REITs are more likely to be 100% primary issues. 
Generally, this indicates higher share retention (overhang); however, as noted above 
this is not the case. Thus, there must be some underlying difference in structure. 
Specifically, the relations suggest that there are very few preexisting shares, at least 
relative to traditional issues. So, even if all shares are retained, the number of new 
shares created is so large in comparison that overhang, as a whole, is extremely low. 
This is simply a function of industry structure and the configuration of REIT 
securities in that REITs are primarily formed using the new proceeds generated from 
the issue. This relation is robust, however, to controlling for UPREITs. So, even in 
this structure where a greater number of preexisting "shares" exists, they are small 
relative to new proceeds gathered. 
It appears there may be significant differences between the two types of 
investments in relation to issuance costs. However, various issue charactetistics are 
also significantly different, and this could be dtiving those results. Therefore, we 
implement more robust statistical analyses using a matched sample. More 
specifically, we match each REIT issue to a traditional issue by size and issue date. 
We present summary statistics for this matched sample in Table 2. The primary 
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difference we find is that AdjOCI is no longer significantly larger for RElT issues. 
We attribute this change to the greater consistency in size, which is the only other 
result that changes; however, we further explore this, and other possibilities, in the 
multivariate analysis contained in the subsequent section. 
Results 
Information Asymmetry and Issue Cost 
To control for underlying relations, we continue our analysis by estimating the 
following OLS regression model: 
DePi = 0 + (3, REIT + (32 ShareOver + (33 LnProceeds + (34 Rank + (35 Primary 
+(36 Integer + ,67PartialU + (38 PartialD + (39 CrspVWIS + (3'0 Nineties 
+(3,,2000s + Ci 
(2) 
where the Depi is either Initial, OCI, AdjOCI, or Revision5 RElT is a dummy 
variable that equals one for the 209 RElT rpO issues, zero otherwise. If RElT issues 
are associated with a lower level of pricing uncertainty, this should result in lower 
levels of information asymmetry. This will then result in a negative relation between 
RElT and the issue cost variables. We also include the variable SharcOver in the 
regression to control for the level of share retention, since the univariate analysis 
suggests this variable IS important in determining the cost of issuance to preexisting 
owners. Based on the rationale presented earlier, we also include each independent 
variable identified in Panel B of Table 1. The results are presented in Table 3. 
We find the predicted negative relation in regards to Initial, indicating that REIT 
issues have significantly lower levels of underpricing. Specifically, a REIT IPO 
experiences, on average, 4.61 % (absolute) lower underpricing than a comparable 
traditional issue. This is consistent with the belief that REIT issues are easier to value 
and therefore are associated with less information asymmetry and lower values of 
MLOT. We fmd supporting evidence in the specification where the dependent 
variable is Revision, although the significance is marginal (p value=O.l 0). 
However, as previously discussed, an alternative measure of issuance cost is the 
cost to existing shareholders, as some issues have a significant percentage of the 
shares retained within the preexisting ownership structure while other issues have no 
preexisting shares. Therefore, OCI may be a more appropriate measure of issuance 
costs, particularly given the preexisting ownership structure of the RElT industry. 
We find the relation between REIT and OCI to be insignificant, indicating that any 
reduced cost of issuance is not necessarily to the benefit of the existing owners. 
Examining AdjOCI, we find that the estimated coefficient switches to the 
predicted negative sign, which would indicate lower issuance costs. However, the 
coefficient is only significant at a relatively low level, indicating our results are 
robust to controlling for ownership units in UPREITs. Therefore, models such as 
Wang et a1. (1992) and Ling and Ryngaert (1997) that find RElT fPOs to be 
associated with a relatively lower cost of issuance may be capturing a different 
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phenomenon than true opportunity costs, which may simply be a bias of the different 
ownership structure within the REIT industry. 
Types of REITs 
To extend previous work, we also examine the type of REIT issue. As mentioned in 
a earlier section, there are two distinct types of REITs: (I) Equity and (2) Mortgage. 
There is a natural difference between the two types in tenns of investment securities. 
For example, mortgage REITs may be different in that the underlying securities are 
easier to value than those of equity REITs. Specifically, it is likely easier to sum the 
amount of monthly mortgage notes due than to appraise the value of properties. On 
the other hand, there is likely a higher risk of default with mOligage REITs than 
equity REITs, as they are not directly associated with a physical asset base. Beyond 
underlying asset holdings, a significant additional difference exists between 
mortgage and equity REIT-i.e., the UPREIT structure is typically confined to 
equity REITs. These differences provide the incentive needed in segmenting the 
sample. We identify 39 mortgage and 156 equity issues. The remaining issues are 
identified as hybrids, which are excluded to allow for a clearer analysis of the 
relative risks of each issue. Summary statistics are presented in Table 4. 
We find no significant differences between the two samples in the univariate 
analysis in any of the issue cost measures (Initial, OCI, and AdjOCI) or price 
revisions. We do find, though, that mortgage issues are more likely to be priced on 
an integer and are associated with lower quality underwriters. We also find more 
equity issues in the 1990s and a higher prevalence of mortgage issues in the 2000s. 
To further examine the distinction between the two types of REIT issues, we 
estimate the coefficients of the following model using a matched sample of REIT 
lPOs (excluding Hybrids) and traditional (non-REII) lPOs: 
Depi = a + /31 Mortgage + /32 Equity + /33 ShareOver + /34LnProceeds 
+/35 Rank + /36 Primary + /37 Integer + /38 PartialU + /39 PartialD (3) 
+/310CrspVW15 +/311 Nineties +/3122000s +Ei 
where Mortgage (Equity) is a dummy variable equal to one if the REIT issue is a 
mortgage (equity), zero otherwise. Results are presented in Table 5, including an F 
test between the coefficients on Mortgage and Equity. We find both REIT types are 
negatively related to Initial, which is similar to our earlier findings, and there appears 
to be no significant difference between the two REIT types. A similar relation exists 
for offer price revisions, although the coefficient on Mortgage is not significant. 
In contrast, the insignificant relation between REIT and OCI in Table 3 appears to 
be driven by differing relations between mortgage and equity REITs. An F test 
indicates the difference between the coefficients on equity and mortgage REITs is 
significant, which suggesls mortgage REITs have lower costs to existing owners 
than equity REITs. However, since adjusted share overhang is higher for equity 
REITs, we hypothesize the difference is attributable to the use of umbrella 
partnerships, which is a structure unique to equity REITS. This conjecture is 
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consistent with the results related to adjusted OCl, which indicate an insignificant 
relation between both types of REITs and AdjOCI. Further, the F test indicates no 
statistical difference between the two coefficients. Thus, once we control for umbrella 
partnerships, the type of REIT appears to be unimportant in determining the level of 
indirect issue cost. 
Conclusions 
We compare REIT lPOs that went public between 1986 and 2004 to traditional 
issues during that same time period. We find that REIT issues are associated with 
lower levels of issue cost, at least as typically defined by initial-day underpricing. 
Further, we find that REIT issues are associated with lower offer price revisions, 
which is consistent with reduced information asymmetries. However, when using an 
alternative method for estimating issue costs, we find no significant difference 
between the two groups of lPOs. This alternative measure proxies for the cost to 
preexisting owners. Therefore, our findings suggest that although underpricing 
appears to be lower, the total cost of REIT lPOs to preexisting owners is about the 
same as traditional issues. We attribute the difference to the inherent nature of share 
ownership in the REIT industry. 
We further segment our sample into mortgage and equity REITs, the latter of 
which is more likely to employ umbrella partnerships. Once we control for the 
additional preexisting ownership base for this specific ownership structure, we find 
no significant relation between either type of REIT and the opportunity cost of 
issuance. Thus, we find no evidence of existing owners of either REIT type having 
an incremental advantage (i.e., lower costs of issuance) over the other. 
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